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NUTS AND BOLTS: ESTATE PLANNING AND
FAMILY LAW CONSIDERATIONS FOR
SAME-SEX FAMILIES
PATIENCE CROZIER

*

Five years after the landmark decision of Goodridge v. Depart
ment of Public Health 1 many questions remain open for lawyers,
clients, governmental agencies, and courts about its ramifications.
In the intertwined subject areas of family law and estate planning, it
is particularly true that gray areas and questions abound, making it
critical for practitioners to stay informed about changes in the law
to identify and resolve any problems that may arise. When couples
come through the office door to discuss adoption, the implications
of marriage, prenuptial agreements, donor agreements, or domestic
partner agreements, it is essential to remember that the protections
they need go beyond the family law realm. A basic knowledge of
estate planning is critical to educating and advising family law cli
ents. Likewise, a basic understanding of family law is critical for the
estate planner because the public policy underlying family law af
fects estate planning.
This Article goes back to the basics to consider foundational
principles and statutes and how family law intersects with estate
planning when the clients are same-sex couples. Part I addresses
married couples and the estate planning basics these couples must
consider. Part II addresses non-marital couples and what estate
planning basics these couples must consider, though analyzing the
surprising consistency of issues for same-sex couples regardless of

* Patience (Polly) Crozier is an associate at the Law Office of Joyce Kauffman,
where her practice focuses on all areas of family law, particularly co-parent adoption,
divorce, paternity, and guardianships. She serves on the board of the Massachusetts
Lesbian and Gay Bar Association and on the Sterling Committee of the Boston Bar
Association's Family Law Section and is a member of the MBA/BBA Joint Alimony
Task Force. She served as a law clerk to the justices of the Massachusetts Probate and
Family Court and as a law clerk to the Honorable Irma S. Raker of the Maryland Court
of Appeals. She earned her JD, magna cum laude, from Boston College Law School
where she was a Public Interest Scholar, the Editor-in-Chief of the Boston College
Third World Law Journal, and co-chair of the Lambda Law Students Association. She
also holds a BA, with distinction, from Yale University.
1. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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marital status. Part III addresses divorce and estate planning. Part
IV addresses issues relating to children.
I.

ESTATE PLANNING FOR MARRIED COUPLES

Goodridge was a landmark case. The power of having a state's
high court proclaim the equality of same-sex couples under the law
cannot be underestimated. The emotional benefit of being able to
marry under state law is enormous. However, the practical benefits
of marriage are less certain. This reality confounds clients who con
sult family lawyers prior to marriage. What benefits will marriage
bring? The answers are surprising. Marriage carries significant
benefits under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in
that it opens up access to inheritance rights, hospital visitation
rights, burial rights, custodial rights to children, and rights to equi
table division of marital property, alimony, and child support. The
implications of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and
questions regarding the portability of marriage mean that same-sex
married couples still must work proactively to protect their fami
lies. 2 Marriage may be a good start for protecting a family, but it is
not enough.
Marriage does impart a number of significant rights under state
law. Parties to a same-sex marriage enjoy all the rights of different
sex married couples under Massachusetts law, and these rights are
particularly powerful in the realm of estate planning. For instance,
intestacy statutes ensure that a surviving spouse will receive at least
a portion of the deceased's estate. 3 Pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 190, section 1, if a person dies with kindred
but no issue and the estate has a value of $200,000 or less, the sur
viving spouse inherits the entire estate. 4 If the estate is valued at
over $200,000 and there is no issue but there are kindred, the sur
viving spouse takes $200,000 and half of the remaining estate. 5 If
there is issue, the surviving spouse takes one-half of the estate and
2. See 1 U.S.c. § 7 (2006) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.").
3. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1 (2006).
4. The intestacy statute does not define issue; however, the term "issue" has come
to mean "all lineal (genetic) descendants," including "both marital and nonmarital de
scendants." Woodward v. Comrn'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Mass. 2002).
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1.
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the other half passes to the issue. 6 If there is neither issue nor kin
dred, the surviving spouse takes the entire estate. 7 Also, if a spouse
dies intestate, the surviving spouse has priority to be appointed as
the administrator of the estate. s
The statutory scheme described above also protects spouses in
the event that the deceased spouse executes a will that effectively
disinherits a surviving spouse. A surviving spouse can waive provi
sions of a will and instead take an elective share. 9 If the deceased
left issue, the surviving spouse can elect to take one-third of the
personal and real property of the estate of the decedent;lO however,
the survivor will only have a life estate and access to income of the
estate.n If the deceased left kindred and no issue, then the surviv
ing spouse takes $25,000 outright and a life estate in one-half of the
remaining personal and real property.12 If the deceased left no is
sue or kindred, the survivor takes $25,000 and one-half of the per
sonal and real property outright.1 3 A surviving spouse can elect, in
the alternative, to claim his or her dower interest in the real estate
of the deceased spouse. 14 A dower interest is the ability to claim a
life estate in one-third of the real property held by the decedent at
the time of death. 15 These statutory provisions express the Com
monwealth's public policy that marriage is a partnership and, even
after death, spouses have a duty to support each other and cannot
6. [d.
7. Id.
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 193, § 1 (2006). Although these intestacy rights are im
portant, they do not negate the need to contemplate and execute a thorough estate
plan. For most couples, the wish is for the entire estate to pass to the spouse, who will
benefit from the assets and ensure that the children, if there are any, are taken care of.
The intestacy statute does not provide for this scenario and could leave the surviving
spouse with fewer financial resources than the decedent intended or desired.
9. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 15 (2006).
10. Interestingly, the estate of the decedent is defined differently in the context of
the elective share than in the context of divorce. See generally Bongaards v. Millen, 793
N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 2003). The estate in the elective share context is limited to the pro
bate estate and any inter vivos trusts created and controlled by the decedent; therefore,
the estate in this context is much more limited than the marital estate used for equitable
division of marital property. See generally id. There is agreement amongst the bar that
the elective share statute is outmoded and in need of revision. See id. at 352.
11. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 15.
12. [d.
13. [d.
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 189, § 1 (2006).
15. [d.; see 14C HOWARD ALPERIN & LAWRENCE D. SHUBOW, MASSACHUSETTS
PRACfICE § 22.32 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that claiming a dower interest is infrequent
because it is generally of greater value to the survivor to take via other options availa
ble, such as the will, intestacy, or elective share).
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disinherit a surviving spouse. I6 The legislature has limited the testa
mentary rights of spouses and has made it clear that one simply
cannot disinherit a spouseP
Massachusetts law contains special provisions for married
couples beyond the orderly transmission of property and property
rights upon death. Marriage provides significant protections in
terms of hospital visitation, organ donation, and control over bodily
remains. A spouse is considered next-of-kin and has the right of
visitation in a Massachusetts hospital as well as the authority to
consent to medical treatment if the other is incapacitated. I8 A sur
viving spouse has priority over all others in determining whether to
donate the deceased's organs if the deceased spouse has not already
determined otherwise in a will or other writing. I9 A surviving
spouse has priority over all others in obtaining possession of the
bodily remains of a deceased spouse.20 If a deceased spouse has not
determined by will where he or she wishes to be buried or interred,
a surviving spouse has priority to determine where to bury or how
to dispose of the bodily remains. 21 Cemetery plots of spouses are
exempt from the ordinary rules of conveyance and inheritance so
that a surviving spouse may use a cemetery plot held by the dece
dent spouse to bury his or her own remains. 22
Despite the significant protections afforded under state law as
a result of a valid marriage, these protections will not apply under
DOMA and under the law of our sister states that have enacted
some form of DOMA at the state level. As a result, it is critical that
same-sex couples execute comprehensive estate planning docu
ments, including a health care proxy, Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) waiver, living will, durable power
of attorney, and will.
A.

Health Care Proxy

Massachusetts General Laws chapter 201D authorizes the cre
ation of a health care proxy.23 A health care proxy empowers a
16. See Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 2003).
17. L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359, 364 n.15 (Mass. 2000).
18. See Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 64-65 (Mass. 1999).
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 113, §§ 8, 10, 12 (2006).
20. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 38, § 13 (2006).
21. Vaughn v. Vaughn, 200 N.E. 912, 913 (Mass. 1936); 1 CHARLES P.
KINDEGRAN, JR. & MONROE L. INKER, MASSACHUSElTS PRACfICE § 16:10 (3d ed.
2002).
22. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, §§ 32, 33 (2006).
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (2006).
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person, the agent, to make health care decisions on behalf of an
individual, the principal, who cannot make or communicate health
care decisions on his or her own. 24 The agent will also have hospital
access and priority in medical decision making. Whether someone
can make or communicate a health care decision is determined by
an attending physician.25 The health care agent's authority begins
when it is determined "that the principal lacks the capacity to make
or to communicate health care decisions."26 When an attending
physician determines that the principal has regained capacity to
make and communicate health care decisions, the agent's authority
to make those decisions ceases, and it is again the principal who
must consent to the treatment at issue.27 A principal may revoke a
health care proxy at any time. By statutory design, revocation is a
simple process; the principal simply must notify the agent or health
care provider orally or in writing of his or her intent to revoke the
proxy.28 A proxy is also revoked by executing another proxy.29 If
the principal divorces, the entry of a judgment of divorce absolute
revokes the proxy to the extent that the former spouse can no
longer serve as an agent. 30
It is critical that married same-sex couples execute health care
proxies, particularly if they travel out of state. Other states may not
recognize same-sex spouses as next-of-kin, and designating a spouse
as the health care agent clarifies that the spouse should make health
care decisions in the event of incapacitation, regardless of jurisdic
tion. It is important to note, however, that health care proxy stat
utes may differ significantly in various states. If spouses spend a
substantial amount of time in a state other than Massachusetts,
those couples should consider executing a second health care proxy
under the laws of the other state. Of course, both proxies should be

24. [d. §§ 1, 2, 4, 5. Medical decisions include decisions regarding physical and
mental health. See Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Mass. 2002). It is important
to note that the statute contemplates that the decision of the health care agent is not
absolute. A family member, friend, or other person may object to the decision of a
health care agent and seek to resolve a dispute in the Probate and Family Court. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 17.
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 6.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

[d.
[d.
[d. § 7.
[d.
[d.
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consistent with one another so as not to create an additional level of
complexity and confusion. 31
B.

HIPAA Waiver

An important companion document to a health care proxy is a
limited waiver of the requirements of HIPAA.32 A health care
agent needs medical information about the principal in order to
make competent and rational health care decisions on the princi
pal's behalf. Some medical professionals interpret HIPAA to pro
hibit releasing private medical information to a health care agent,
absent an explicit waiver of HIPAA from the principal. Given
HIPAA and society'S concern with medical privacy, one must
clearly waive medical privacy laws to ensure that a health care
agent has unfettered access to medical information so that she or he
can make informed health care decisions and can release health
care information to the attorney-in-fact as needed. A HIPAA
waiver is often a separate, stand-alone document that is in effect for
a certain period of time, for instance, ten years.
C.

Living Will

A health care proxy sets forth the person that a principal
wishes to make health care decisions on his or her behalf; however,
a living will sets forth what medical actions or decisions the princi
pal wishes to be undertaken in the event that the principal is termi
nally ill or permanently unconscious with no expectation of
recovery. A living will generally specifies whether life-sustaining
treatments, including nutrition and hydration, are to be maintained
if a person is in a condition where there is a negligible chance of
returning to consciousness. 33 Massachusetts does not have a statute
providing for living wills. 34 The health care proxy statute is in
tended to cover these types of decisions and enables health care
agents to make all health care decisions, including the provision of
nutrition and hydration, unless limited by the terms of the proxy.35
31. It is also wise for clients to carry with them copies of their health care proxies,
powers of attorney, and certificate of marriage, if applicable. Medical and other profes
sionals may require documentation, and it is wise to ensure that these life-saving docu
ments are on one's person at all times, particularly when traveling.
32. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2007).
33. Massachusetts courts recognize nutrition and hydration to be medical treat
ment. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 n.ll (Mass. 1992) (citing Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986)).
34. Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 719 n.12 (Mass. 2002).
35. 22 SEAN M. DUNPHY, MASSACHUSEITS PRACTICE § 44.3 (2d ed. 1997).
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However, many attorneys advise clients to execute living wills as
documents to inform the health care agent of the principal's wishes
should a decision have to be made about continuing or terminating
life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, although living wills are not
expressly authorized by Massachusetts law, living wills can provide
evidence of a person's intent regarding life-sustaining treatments
should a dispute arise, and such evidence is persuasive to a trial
court making a substituted judgment determination. 36

D. Durable Power of Attorney
Another critical document is a durable power of attorney,
which provides for continued financial decision making despite in
capacity. A durable power of attorney is authorized under Massa
chusetts General Laws chapter 201B.37 In this document, a person
nominates an attorney-in-fact to act on his or her behalf in financial
affairs and confers the ability to act despite the disability or inca
pacity of the principal.38 The durable power must include the fol
lowing language, or its equivalent, to be operational: "This power
of attorney shall not be affected by the subsequent disability or in
capacity of the principal."39 Any actions taken by the attorney-in
fact are binding on all parties involved in a transaction as if the
actions were done by the principa1. 40 In a durable power of attor
ney, a principal also can nominate a guardian or conservator. 41 This
is a very important provision and should be included in every docu
ment granting a durable power of attorney. At some point, even
with a power of attorney, court intervention may become necessary.
For instance, a court-appointed guardian may be necessary to ad
minister certain medications. When a principal nominates a guard
ian or conservator, a court must defer to the principal's most recent
nomination of such a fiduciary unless there is good cause not to do
SO.42 Considering who should be a court-appointed fiduciary in ad
vance is preferable to having the court appoint a guardian or con
servator who the principal would not desire.
36. Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1267-68 (noting that one of the factors in a substituted
judgment analysis is the patient's expressed preferences).
37. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201B (2006).
38. See id. § 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. [d.
40. [d. § 2.
41. [d. § 3(b).
42.

[d.
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A durable power of attorney can be present or springing in
nature. A present power of attorney becomes effective at signing
and remains effective indefinitely, but is intended for use only when
the principal becomes incapacitated or designates that he or she
wishes the attorney to act on his or her behalf.43 A springing power
of attorney becomes effective when a principal becomes incapaci
tated. 44 The benefit of a present power over a springing power is
that there is no need to prove or demonstrate incapacity; therefore,
the attorney-in-fact may move more swiftly to manage financial af
fairs. In general, it is advisable to have a present durable power of
attorney. If one cannot trust his or her attorney-in-fact to act only
when appropriate, then that person should not be an attorney-in
fact under any circumstances.
A durable power of attorney is a critical document for married
and unmarried people. 45 With this document in place, institutions
should recognize the authority of the spouse named as attorney-in
fact to handle the financial affairs of the incapacitated spouse.
Whether the marriage is recognized should be irrelevant. Also,
when advising couples who keep most of their assets separate, a
durable power of attorney is essential to permit the use of the prin
cipal's funds during incapacity.46 Funds may be necessary to secure
nursing care, to make mortgage payments, and to ensure otherwise
that the principal's needs are being met.
Generally, a power of attorney is revoked by death.47 Death
revokes a power of attorney when the attorney-in-fact has actual
knowledge that death has occurred. 48 The Massachusetts statutory
scheme does not, other than death, provide for revocation or termi
nation of a power of attorney.49 In other words, unlike a will or a
health care proxy, a power of attorney is not revoked automatically
by a judgment of divorce. One must proactively revoke a power of
attorney by writing a new power of attorney or destroying the old
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "durable power of
attorney" as "[a] power of attorney that remains in effect during the grantor's
incompetency").
44. Id. (defining "springing power of attorney" as "[a] power of attorney that
becomes effective only when needed, at some future date or upon some future occur
rence, usu. upon the principal's incapacity").
45. RA Y D. MADOFF, CORNELIA R. TENNEY & MARTIN A. HALL, PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING § 3.04 (2007).
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201B, § 4.
47. MADOFF, TENNEY & HALL, supra note 45, § 3:04[E].
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201B, § 4.

49.

See id.
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one. A principal must provide actual notice of revocation or termi
nation to the attorney-in-fact so that he or she knows that he or she
can no longer act on the principal's behalf.50
E.

Will

The foundational document of an estate plan, familiar to most
people, is a will. A will is a document that primarily serves to dic
tate the disposition of a person's probate property at death.5l A
will also nominates a fiduciary to direct the disposition of the estate,
directs what is to be done with bodily remains, and, if applicable,
nominates a guardian for minor children. 52 Any individual over the
age of eighteen and of "sound mind" has the capacity to make a
will. 53 In order to be valid, a will must be executed according to
relatively rigid rules established by statute. 54 There are also statu
tory methods outlined for proper revocation of a will,55 All individ
uals, even those with limited assets, should have a will as part of
their estate plan, particularly parents of minor children. 56 Although
a court is not required to appoint the guardians nominated in the
will, a court will generally respect the choice of the deceased par
ent,57 If there is no guardian appointed and no other legal parent, a
court is empowered to appoint a guardian of its own choice. 58
When working with a married couple, it is important to advise the
couple that marriage revokes a will unless the will includes lan
guage indicating that it was executed in contemplation of mar
riage. 59 As a result, if the partners already have wills that were
50. See id.
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1 (2006); see also MADOFF, TENNEY & HALL,
supra note 45, § 3:02. Nonprobate property, such as life insurance proceeds and jointly
held property, passes as dictated in their governing documents and does not pass ac
cording to a will. [d.
52. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201, § 3 (2006) (empowering parents to appoint a
testamentary guardian of a minor child); id. § 5 (noting that a surviving parent shall
have custody unless proven unfit); MADOFF, TENNEY & HALL, supra note 45, § 3:02[A].
These statutes underscore the importance of adoption for same-sex couples. Without a
legal relationship to a child, a parent does not enjoy these protections.
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1.
54. [d. §§ 1, 2.
55. [d. § 8.
56. MADOFF, TENNEY & HALL, supra note 45, § 3:02.
57. [d.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201, § 5. The wishes of a decedent who
nominates a guardian who is not the surviving parent will not be recognized unless the
surviving parent is unfit or consents to the guardianship. [d.
58. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201, § 2; MADOFF, TENNEY & HALL, supra note 45,
§ 3:02[A][4].
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 9.
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drafted prior to their marriage that were not executed in contem
plation of marriage, those wills are of no effect. 6D

F.

Prenuptial Agreements

Another aspect of working with a same-sex married couple en
gaged in estate planning is an understanding of prenuptial agree
ments. It is critical at the outset to determine whether the couple
has a prenuptial agreement. Massachusetts law expressly permits
married couples to enter into a contract regarding marital rights
and property prior to solemnizing their marriage. 6l A prenuptial
agreement determines rights and obligations not only upon divorce
but also upon death. The rights described above, including the elec
tive share, intestacy rights, and dower rights can be limited or
waived altogether in a prenuptial agreement.
Most Massachusetts cases focus on enforcement of prenuptial
agreements upon divorce. 62 A court will enforce a prenuptial
agreement that it finds was fair and reasonable at the time of execu
tion unless "enforcement of the agreement would leave the con
testing spouse 'without sufficient property, maintenance, or
appropriate employment to support' herself."63 This standard is a
high one to meet, and the trend in Massachusetts is towards en
forcement of prenuptial agreements at divorce. 64 It is likely that a
similar analysis would be applied at death, leading to similarly
strong enforcement of fair prenuptial agreements. 6S One unpub
lished Massachusetts case recognized and enforced a prenuptial
agreement wherein a wife waived her right to claim an elective
share. 66 In its analysis, the Superior Court of Massachusetts noted
that a majority of states enforce prenuptial agreements at death. 67
If a couple seeking estate planning has a prenuptial agreement, it is
60. See id.
61. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 25 (2006).
62. See generally, e.g., Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 2006); Austin
v. Austin, 839 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2005); DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass.
2002).
63. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d at 812 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 HOMER H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN TI-rE UNITED STATES § 1.9 (2d ed.
1988)).
64. See generally Austin, 839 N.E.2d 837; DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797.
65. See Collins v. Collins, 98 N.E. 588 (Mass. 1912) (enforcing in equity a prenup
tial agreement wherein a wife waived all interest in a husband's estate for the sum of
$1000). See generally Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385 (Mass. 1979).
66. See Bickford v. Bickford, No. 97-1569-B, 1999 WL 33226458, at *8 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1999).
67. See id. at *5.
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important to review the agreement prior to taking the engagement
or drafting any documents. It could be that the agreement's provi
sions make joint representation unethical. It could also be that the
prenuptial agreement is largely irrelevant because it permits both
parties to make dispositions freely via a will. Regardless, it is criti
cal to inquire about existing prenuptial agreements and to contem
plate how the agreements impact the estate plan. 68
II.

ESTATE PLANNING FOR NON-MARITAL COUPLES

When an unmarried couple seeks legal advice about family law
issues, it is critical to understand how to protect the family in the
realm of estate planning and end-of-life transitions. The family's
legal vulnerabilities are considerable, given the couple's unmarried
status. An unmarried couple, regardless of the duration and com
mitment of their relationship, will not have access to the rights flow
ing from marriage. 69 Massachusetts does not recognize common
law marriage. 70 To the contrary, Massachusetts has a strong public
policy commitment to marriage as the foundation of family and as a
social institution of great significance,11 The Supreme Judicial
Court has repeatedly refused to subvert marriage by extending its
benefits and obligations to unmarried cohabitants. 72 Unmarried
couples are generally regarded as legal strangers; therefore, they
are vulnerable with regard to inheritance, property rights at death,
and end-of-life decision making,13

68. There is a new tendency towards drafting of postnuptial agreements as well,
and it is wise also to ask about whether such an agreement exists or whether the couple
intends to pursue such an agreement. Whether such agreements are enforceable is an
open issue.
69. See supra Part 1. All unmarried couples are vulnerable regardless of gender.
Except regarding children, where unmarried same-sex couples are particularly vulnerable, unmarried couples of all sorts lack the benefits bestowed by marriage.
70. Sutton v. Valois, 846 N.E.2d 1171, 1175 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (citing Collins
v. Guggenheim, 631 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. 1994)).
71. French v. McAnarney, 195 N.E. 714, 715 (Mass. 1935).
72. Sutton, 846 N.E.2d at 1175.
73. See generally Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1975); Northrup v.
Brigham, 826 N.E.2d 239 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (discussing equitable claims of an un
married cohabitant after her companion died and failed to provide for her via will). In
both of these cases, surviving unmarried cohabitants who were promised to be provided
for by will were left to litigate equitable claims because they had no legal right to inherit
from the decedent via the intestacy statutes.

•
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When an unmarried partner dies without a will, the surviving
partner will not inherit through intestacy statutes.74 The unmarried
person's estate passes first to the decedent's children and to the liv
ing issue of any deceased children.75 If the decedent has no chil
dren or issue, the estate passes to the decedent's parents.76 If the
decedent has no living parent, the estate passes to the decedent's
siblings and the living issue of any siblings.77 In the absence of all
others, the estate will escheat, which means it will pass to the
state. 78 An unmarried partner is simply not included in any manner
and will not inherit.7 9
Because the statutory scheme does not provide for unmarried
partners, an unmarried couple must act on its own to secure as
many legal protections as possible through alternate routes. The
unmarried couple protects itself in the same way as a married
couple, namely, by executing a comprehensive estate plan that in
cludes a will, health care proxy, living will, and durable power of
attorney. The unmarried couple should also consider owning prop
erty jointly during their lifetimes by taking title to real property as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship. In Massachusetts, a critical
characteristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship.8o When
one joint tenant dies, title to the entire property automatically
transfers to the surviving owner. 81 No will or court intervention is
required. The property never becomes part of the estate, but in
stead, by operation of law, the property passes to the surviving joint
owner. 82 It is important to note that the deed must explicitly state
that the parties intend to take title as joint tenants. 83 In the absence
74. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, §§ 1-3 (2006); see also Northrup, 826 N.E.2d at
240 n.3 (stating that the intestate's live-in companion, Betsy Northrup, did not inherit
under intestacy statutes).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 3(1).
76. Id. § 3(2)-(4).
77. Id. § 3(5).
78. Id.
79. It is possible for an unmarried partner to seek certain rights. For instance, if a
dispute arises about a burial location or who has possession of remains, a partner can
bring a complaint in equity in the probate and family court. A partner can also chal
lenge a medical decision made by a family member. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D,
§ 17 (2006). However, these options are options of last resort. They involve litigation
that can be costly, protracted, and often lead to long-term family acrimony.
80. ALPERIN & SHUBOW, supra note 15, § 17:42.
81. See Weaver v. City of New Bedford, 140 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Mass. 1957).
82. Although property may pass outside of the probate estate, it may still be con
sidered part of the taxable estate. This Article does not address tax issues, which must
be considered as part of a detailed estate plan.
83. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7 (2006).
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of specificity, the law presumes that two people, even married peo
ple, take property as tenants in common. 84 When one holds prop
erty as a tenant in common, upon death, the half owned by the
deceased tenant descends as any other property of the estate-the
property does not automatically pass to the other tenant in
common.
It is also advisable for unmarried couples to hold some per
sonal proper:ty jointly.85 Parties may keep funds in a joint bank ac
count that grants access to both of them. 86 However, the couple
must understand that, with joint accounts, either party has the right
to remove any or all of the funds at his or her discretion. 8? Upon
the death of one owner, the other retains sole ownership of the re
maining funds. 88 The funds do not pass by a will or intestacy.
Other than joint tenancies, unmarried couples should also en
sure that non probate property-for example, life insurance policies
and retirement accounts such as 401Ks-will be disposed of at
death, pursuant to the decedent's wishes. Both partners should re
view the beneficiary designations on their policies and ensure that
the designations are appropriate. This is crucial because these as
sets will pass automatically to the beneficiary and will not become
part of the probate estate. 89
III.

ESTATE PLANNING AND THE END OF
A COMMITTED RELATIONSHIP

An estate plan should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure
that the documents provide for intended beneficiaries and to ensure
that fiduciary appointments remain appropriate. The end of a com
mitted relationship is a milestone that necessitates reviewing and
amending estate planning documents. 9o
84. See id.; 5 FRANCIS T. TALTY, PATRICIA SULLIVAN & ALAN L. BRAUNSTEIN,
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 7:38 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that joint tenancies are
disfavored and that MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 7, was enacted to reverse the common
law presumption in favor of joint tenancies).
85. Holding title in joint name may have adverse tax consequences and should be
done only after consultation with a tax advisor.
86. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167D, § 5 (2006).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See generally Foster v. Hurley, 826 N.E.2d 719, 729 (Mass. 2005) (noting that
the deceased's probate estate was limited and imposing a constructive trust on life in
surance proceeds that passed to a beneficiary in violation of a separation agreement).
90. Other triggers for a review include, among other things, an inheritance, the
birth of a child, the death of a beneficiary, or simply the passing of a significant period
of time.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

764

[Vol. 30:751

For married couples who divorce, the laws of the Common
wealth of Massachusetts provide built-in protections to ensure that
a former spouse does not take under a will or remain a fiduciary.
The law presumes that former spouses should no longer have any
right to the property of a deceased spouse, or any right to serve as a
fiduciary to make critical decisions for the former spouse. 91 When a
judgment of divorce is entered, certain key revocations come into
place by operation of law.92 Pursuant to Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 191, section 9, divorce automatically revokes will pro
visions that benefit a former spouse. Pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 201D, section 7, divorce automatically re
vokes the appointment of a former spouse as a health care proxy.93
It is important to note that neither serving a complaint for di
vorce nor a judgment on a complaint for separate support is suffi
cient to revoke provisions benefiting an estranged spouse, because
neither of those events terminates the marriage. Therefore, during
divorce proceedings, estate planning provisions benefiting an es
tranged spouse will remain in place. It is arguable whether a spouse
can make comprehensive changes to an estate plan to remove all
provisions benefiting an estranged spouse during divorce proceed
ings. It is possible that the automatic restraining order applies to
estate planning and that both parties must maintain the status quo
estate plan that was in place during the marriage. 94 This might be a
91.

See, e.g., MASS.

GEN.

LAWS ch. 191, § 9 (2006); MASS.

GEN.

LAWS ch. 201D,

§ 7 (2006).

92. A judgment of divorce absolute is an operative judgment, not a judgment of
divorce nisi. A marriage is not actually terminated until the judgment becomes abso
lute. Ross v. Ross, 430 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Mass. 1982). If a spouse dies during the nisi
period, the former spouse will be entitled to take under the will and claim an elective
share. See id.
93. The statute states, in relevant part: "A health care proxy shall also be re
voked upon ... the divorce or legal separation of the principal and his spouse, where
the spouse is the principal's agent under a health care proxy." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
201D, § 7. Interestingly, revocation differs for will provisions and for health care prox
ies. It appears that a judgment on a complaint for separate support, which is the closest
that Massachusetts comes to a legal separation, is enough to revoke the designation of a
spouse as a health care agent. For a will, the status of husband and wife must be sev
ered, and only a judgment of divorce absolute severs the marital relationship. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 9; Ross, 430 N.E.2d at 819.
94. In a divorce matter, Massachusetts Supplemental Probate Court Rule 411 be
comes effective for the plaintiff when a complaint for divorce is filed. The rule becomes
effective for the defendant when the defendant is served with the complaint. Rule 411
enforces the financial status quo during divorce proceedings. Parties cannot transfer or
use funds or change insurance policies and their beneficiaries except for under certain
circumstances or with the permission of the other party or the court. MASS. SuPP. R.
PROB. CT. 411 (2007).
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sound argument with regard to property, but it is an unsuccessful
argument with regard to fiduciary appointments. In other words, it
might be appropriate to keep intact provisions regarding property,
but it seems inappropriate to permit one's estranged spouse to con
tinue to make important health care and financial decisions on
one's behalf. If one is in the midst of divorce and wishes to make
changes to an estate plan that involve property interests, it may be
prudent to give notice to the other side and, if necessary, seek per
mission of a probate and family court. In the event that an es
tranged spouse dies during divorce proceedings and prior to entry
of a judgment of divorce absolute, the survivor can still seek an
elective share, even if the will has been changed.
When an unmarried couple ends a relationship, the protections
afforded to divorcing couples, such as the automatic revocation of
relevant portions of a will and health care proxy, are not available.
An unmarried couple must be aware and active to ensure that an
estate plan is properly amended after a separation. As discussed
above, a judgment of divorce acts automatically to revoke will pro
visions that benefit a former spouse and appoint the former spouse
as a health care agent. For unmarried couples, nothing is auto
matic. Unmarried couples must act consciously to revoke docu
ments that include dispositions to or appointments of former
partners. Failure to revoke these documents risks gifting property
to a former partner when there is, in fact, no intention for that per
son to receive property. Even worse, unamended documents
designating a former partner as a health care agent enable a former
partner to make critical health decisions on the other partner's be
half. An unmarried person who has terminated a committed rela
tionship should consult an estate planner, carefully review former
documents, and either amend or revoke the documents as needed.
Regardless of marital status, at the end of a committed rela
tionship, it is unwise to greatly disturb one aspect of the estate
plan-provisions for guardianships of minors. At the end of a rela
tionship, there is often a desire to nominate a person other than the
child's remaining legal parent as a guardian. Although a custodial
parent may feel strongly that the former spouse or partner is not
emotionally attuned with the child following the end of a relation
ship, the former spouse or partner's role as legal parent must be
respected. 95 When one legal parent dies, the other legal parent has
95.

See

MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 201, § 5 (2006).
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a right to custody of a child. 96 This may be true even if the surviv
ing parent is estranged and has played little to no active role in the
child's life. 97 Unless a parent is unfit, a parent has a right to custody
of his or her child over all other claimants. 98 Proving unfitness is a
very high bar. It requires a showing, by clear and convincing evi
dence, that a parent is currently unfit to further the welfare and
best interests of a particular child. 99
After the end of a relationship involving children, it is impor
tant to consult with the former partner regarding guardianship pro
visions in a will to ensure clarity as to the appropriate care of
children after the death of either partner. Each partner should
nominate the other as guardian and, ideally, should agree on an
appropriate successor guardian or guardians in the event of the
death of both parents during the children's minority. Partners
should discuss the importance of maintaining desired religious tra
ditions and relationships with extended families, doing their best to
put aside rancor and, instead, focusing on the children's best inter
ests. In the best case scenario, agreements regarding guardianship
will be articulated in a separation agreement so that the intent of
the parties is clear and the parties have the benefit of discussing the
issue directly.
IV.

CHILDREN

Planning for the future financial security of children is the pri
mary goal of many people's estate planning. While a parent is alive,
the question is how to protect children during a period of parental
incapacity. After the death of a parent, the questions become how
to protect the children's property rights and how to ensure that the
appropriate custodial arrangements are in place. The key to all of
these issues is whether there is a legal relationship between the par
ent and the child.
Whether a couple is married or not, it is critical to establish a
legal relationship between the child and both parents. lOO For mar
96. See id.
97. See Guardianship of Estelle, 875 N.E.2d 515, 517-18 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
98. See id. at 518.
99. See, e.g., Adoption of Nancy, 822 N.E.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Mass. 2005); Guardi
anship of Yushiko, 735 N.E.2d 1260, 1261-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
100. Of course, if the child is the product of a prior relationship, the family law
issues are different. If the child already has two legal parents, the issue of establishing
legal parentage in the new partner, if desired, is more complicated. A legal parent is
distinguished from an equitable parent. For example, Massachusetts recognizes de
facto parents. See generally A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006).
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ried couples in Massachusetts, state law presumptions afford some
rights and protections. However, for all same-sex couples, co-par
ent adoption remains critical because a judicial decree of adoption
will be recognized as a valid determination of parentage by the fed
eral government and sister states. IOI
In Massachusetts, children born within a marriage are pre
sumed to be legitimate children of the married couple. 102 This is
true even when conception occurs through assisted reproduction
and one of the spouses has no genetic relationship to the child. lo3
The Massachusetts Registry of Vital Records and Statistics (Regis
try), the state agency that oversees and issues birth certificates, rec
ognizes that the presumption of legitimacy applies to same-sex
married couples.l 04 The Registry, however, treats birth certificates
of these children on a case-by-case basis. When a child is born to a
same-sex married couple at a Massachusetts hospital, the hospital
A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child, but has
participated in the child's life as a member of the child's family. The de facto
parent resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the
legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the
legal parent . . . . The de facto parent shapes the child's daily routine, ad
dresses his developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides for his educa
tion and medical care, and serves as a moral guide.
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999). A de facto parent may be entitled
to visitation rights, if it is in the child's best interests, but it is unclear whether a de facto
parent may also have rights to legal or physical custody. See generally A.H., 857 N.E.2d
1061.
101. A valid decree of adoption, which is based on parents meeting adoption stat
ute requirements, will likely be recognized by the federal government and other states.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (2006). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
struck down as unconstitutional an Oklahoma law banning state recognition of out-of
state same-sex adoptions. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th CiT. 2007)
("[F]inal adoption orders and decrees are judgments that are entitled to recognition by
all other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Therefore, Oklahoma's adop
tion amendment is unconstitutional in its refusal to recognize final adoption orders of
other states that permit adoption by same-sex couples."). With this statute stricken, it
appears that all states will recognize same-sex adoption decrees from other states. See
generally, e.g., Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Iowa 2008) (stating the limited
ways that an adoption decree can be attacked); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 59
(Neb. 2002) (giving full faith and credit to an adoption decree rendered in Penn
sylvania). Some states such as Texas, however, refuse to issue new birth certificates
after adoption of a child by a same-sex couple. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 192.008 (Vernon 2001) (restricting listing the parents on an adoptive child's birth cer
tificate to a man and a woman).
102. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 6
(2006).
103. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B.
104. This registration differs based on the gender of the couple. See cases cited
infra note 105.
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submits the birth record information to the Registry for approval.
Only after approval by the Registry is the birth record signed by the
parents and forwarded to the Registry for finalization. The birth
certificate obtained will list both spouses as parents. For a female
identified couple, the certificate will list mother and will cross out
father and insert second parent. For a male-identified couple, the
certificate will list father and will cross out mother and replace it
with second parent. lOS For the purposes of state law, children born
to married same-sex couples will generally be the legal, recognized
children of that couple. Since the second parent is listed on the
birth certificate by virtue of marital status, however, it is quite likely
that other states and the federal government will not respect this
document as reflecting legal parentage. Therefore, Massachusetts
recognition of same-sex marriage is not enough.
For unmarried same-sex couples, only the biological parent will
enjoy the benefits of legal parenthood of a child at birth. For fe
male-identified couples, only the birth mother's name will appear
on the birth certificate, unless the other partner has a genetic con
nection through egg donation.106 For male-identified couples, only
the biological father's name will appear on the birth certificate.
Likewise, children of unmarried couples who adopt internationally
will only have one legal parent at adoption. No foreign country
permits lesbian or gay people to adopt, let alone couples. Many gay
or lesbian people attempt to adopt internationally as single people.
Until it becomes possible to pursue a co-parent adoption, the child
will have only one legal parent. For these unmarried couples, a co
105. For married male couples, the names on a birth certificate will depend on
which assisted reproduction procedure was utilized. If the couple chose traditional sur
rogacy, where the birth mother is also the child's genetic mother, then it will not be
possible for both fathers to appear on the original birth certificate. See generally R.R.
v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). There, the surrogate will need to surrender her
parental rights four days after birth, and an adoption will need to be finalized to amend
the birth certificate to include the second father as a legal co-parent. Id. If the couple
chose gestational surrogacy, where the birth mother gestates an egg from an anony
mous egg donor, the couple should petition a probate and family court in equity to
obtain a pre-birth order of parentage clarifying that they are the child's legal parents
and that they should be listed as such on the birth certificate. See generally Hodas v.
Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004); Culliton v. Beth Isf. Deaconess Med. etr., 756
N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2001). The couple will still need to complete an adoption
post-birth because of the concern that other states and the federal government will not
recognize a parentage order based on a Massachusetts marriage, but the carrier will not
be on the birth record as a parent. A pre-birth order of parentage serves as a significant
sign of intent should something happen to the legal parent between birth and adoption.
106. In this instance, the couple should seek a pre-birth equitable order of parent
age to establish both their ties as legal mothers.
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parent adoption must be completed. Pending the finalization of a
co-parent adoption, unmarried couples should consider petitioning
for permanent guardianship of the person and property of the
child.107 In the petition, the legal parent would consent to another
adult, the same-sex partner, sharing guardianship of the child. The
decree of co-guardianship permits the nonlegal parent to act as a
parent for all purposes until the co-parent adoption can be final
ized. 108 Guardianship will permit the nonlegal parent to make med
ical, educational, and financial decisions for the child and to enjoy
custody rights to the child. It is important to note, however, that
guardianship is not the equivalent of legal parenthood,lo9 and an
adoption is the desired route to establish both parties as permanent,
legal parents.
For both married and unmarried couples with children, an
adoption decree is critical to solidifying a universally recognized
parent-child relationship. Establishing legal parentage is crucial be
cause of the parental rights that are implicated when the other par
ent dies or when the adult relationship ends. The rights can be
divided into two broad categories: property rights and custodial
rights. 1lO
Massachusetts and federal law establish certain property rights
for children upon the demise of a legal parent. Woodward v. Com
missioner of Social Security discusses the statutory right of issue to
inherit from their parents and the definition of issue:
Section 1 of the intestacy statute directs that, if a decedent
"leaves issue," such "issue" will inherit a fixed portion of his real
and personal property, subject to debts and expenses, the rights
of the surviving spouse, and other statutory payments not rele
vant here. The intestacy statute does not define "issue." How
ever, in the context of intestacy the term "issue" means all lineal
(genetic) descendants, and now includes both marital and
nonmarital descendants.lll
107. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201, § 2 (2006).
108. See, e.g., id. § 4 (management of estate); id. § 5 (custody and education).
109. For instance, guardianships endure only until a child is eighteen. /d. § 4.
110. Providing for a child via a will is the surest route to ensuring that appropriate
and desired dispositions of property occur. One can make binding determinations
about property to children via a will. A will, however, cannot ensure that the proper
custodial plan is in place for a child. For custody, establishing a legal relationship is
critical because a legal parent will automatically have a right to custody of the child at
the other parent's death.
111. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 263-64 (Mass. 2002); see
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 1 (2006).
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Adopted children are treated the same as biological children under
intestacy statutes and have equal rights to inherit as issue of their
adoptive parents. 112 In addition to these state rights to inherit the
real and personal property of a legal parent, there are important
federal property rights that arise from a legal parent-child relation
ship. The Social Security Act provides benefits to minor children of
qualifying deceased parents. 113 These state and federal property
rights are critical to stabilizing the lives of children by providing
some financial security following the death of a parent.
A legal parent-child relationship also bestows protections re
garding care and custody. A legal parent has a fundamental liberty
interest in the care and custody of his or her child.1l 4 As a result,
on the death of one parent, the remaining legal parent has the right
to custody of a child. To deprive a parent of the right to custody,
the parent must be determined to be unfit.l15 A same-sex parent
who has not adopted the child does not enjoy the presumption of
maintaining custody of the child. Without this presumption and
without a clear nomination of guardianship in a will, bitter custody
disputes could arise between remaining family members of the de
ceased partner and the surviving partner.
No Massachusetts case has determined the rights of an equita
ble parent in relation to relatives of a deceased legal parent. 116 It is
likely that a probate and family court would have the jurisdiction to
determine these competing rights in an equity action. 117 Adoption
would obviate the need for any litigation on this matter and is the
desirable course for the family. Litigation can be lengthy, expen
sive, and destructive to family relationships, and it can result in the
child being deprived of a continuing relationship with the person he
or she views as a parent.
CONCLUSION

This Article raises a few issues to demonstrate the fundamental
connection between family law and estate planning. In the realm of
same-sex marriage, considerable gray area remains in both areas of
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 7 (2006).
113. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 402(d)(I) (2000); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260 n.3.
114. Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d 716, 718, 720 (Mass. 2005); Guardianship of
Estelle, 875 N.E.2d 515, 516 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
115. Estelle, 875 N.E.2d at 517.
116. But see id. at 520-21 (suggesting that a legal parent may have to grant access
to caretakers of a child who establish themselves as de facto parents).
117. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 6 (2006).
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law. It is important to advise clients to plan in advance, to review
estate plans regularly, and to stay informed about changes in the
law. Active planning with competent legal counsel will go a long
way towards avoiding unintended outcomes and expensive
litigation.

